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REVIEW ESSAY
STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT: GETTING IT RIGHT
Richard Norton
Brooks, Risa A. Shaping Strategy: The Civil-Military Politics of
Strategic Assessment. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press,
2008. 315pp. $26.95
An impressive array of cross-disciplinary studies has long pointed to the criti-
cal importance of accurate assessment as a precondition for successful deci-
sion making. The argument is as simple as it is powerful: get the assessment
right and you still might fail, but get it wrong and you are all but guaranteed to
fail. Nowhere is the importance of assessment more important than in the
arena of national security, where leaders risk their states’ futures and, in cases
involving armed conflict, the lives of their citizens and, at times, national
survival.
Given the importance of strategic assessment, any insight into how to im-
prove the process and protect against failure is both useful and welcome. Shap-
ing Strategy provides just such insight. With work clearly rooted in what scholar
Graham Allison has titled “government politics,” Risa Brooks argues that two
key variables—the degree to which military and polit-
ical leaders dominate power relationships among gov-
ernment leaders and their respective organizations,
and the degree to which those leaders agree or dis-
agree over military and political preferences—are
critical in the quality of strategic assessments.
Brooks breaks down the components of strategic as-
sessment into four discrete subcategories: information
sharing, strategic coordination, structural competence,
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and the authorization process. This provides an elegant matrix by which to ana-
lyze the impacts of different power relations and preferences on strategic
assessment.
She first looks at Egypt in the 1960s and 1970s, essentially contrasting the
strategic assessments of Gamal Abdel Nasser and Anwar el-Sadat. Her work in
this regard is excellent; it is painstaking and convincing. She then briefly re-
views six additional cases: five are Great Britain before the First World War,
Germany in the same years, Great Britain during the First World War, Pakistan
from 1997 to 1999, and Turkey from 1996 to 1999. The sixth and most recent,
lesser case focuses on the strategic assessment conducted by the United States
prior to initiating Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, the 2003 war with Iraq.
Brooks concludes that strategic assessment will be more successful when po-
litical leaders are dominant in power relationships and when divergence of pref-
erence from their military leaders is low. In contrast, strategic assessment is most
likely to be poor when military and political leaders share power and preference
divergence is high. In the majority of the selected cases, the evidence for this
conclusion is compelling.
However, the case of the United States raises some questions. Brooks holds
the U.S. strategic assessment in the case of Iraq to have been very poor, basing
this judgment on the clear failure of postcombat stability operations. She points
out that relations between Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and his senior
military leaders initially had been marked by significant strain, only to note that
by 2003 most, if not all, senior military leaders had been selected by Rumsfeld,
greatly reducing those tensions. Brooks also fails to address the contradiction
between the stunning successes of U.S. forces in the combat phase of IRAQI
FREEDOM in contrast to later failures in stability operations. In other words, how
did the same people get the first part so right and the second part so wrong? She
is also silent on how the State Department was all but excluded in planning
Phase IV (the occupation), and on the degree to which Secretary Rumsfeld may
have been influenced by strategic assessments made by different government
agencies, such as the CIA, as well as by Iraqi exiles and powerful political indi-
viduals, such as the vice president. This is interesting, because Brooks’s ap-
proach—examining power distribution and preference divergence—should
shine an explanatory light on these intracabinet and extramilitary relationships as
well.
One of the major strengths of Shaping Strategy is Brooks’s refusal to oversell
her research and conclusions. National-security decision making is one of the
most complex of human activities. It does not lend itself to prescriptive pana-
ceas or simplistic explanatory theories. Brooks’s research is all the more
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important because it does not pretend to do either but rather provides a useful
tool and a practical caution for explaining why strategic assessments tend to fail
under certain conditions and thereby how national leaders might be able to re-
duce the risks of such failures.
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